4.13.2009

藍亭的心靈哲學授課大綱

這學期修了心靈哲學,老師是Tim Lane,一個即將從政大搬過來的教授,有禮、幽默且聰明的老外。第一堂課,大家都被他發下的授課大綱嚇了一跳︰我看過只寫了半頁的,也遇過根本沒做的,可是從來沒有看過厚達15頁的授課大綱。
這份授課大綱非常詳細,除了該有的課程資訊之外,也寫上了Tim寫給初學者的,對於哲學的說明,以及他自己對於哲學的態度。有趣的是,Tim也貼心地對那些看完心靈雞湯、佛洛伊德之後一時衝動跑來修心靈哲學的學生特別說明,這門課裡教的東西,跟書店裡那些完全不一樣!(詳見下)
我很喜歡這份授課大綱,所以在取得Tim的同意後,把它翻成中文貼上來。這份翻譯可能有很多詞不達意和錯誤,而且省略了最後兩個部份,所以也附上英文原文,如果你找到那些錯誤,請糾正我。
...

▌課程簡介

本課程將在英美分析哲學的架構下介紹︰
  1. 關於心靈的主要哲學問題(心物問題、他心問題、心理/物理因果關係、the hard-easy distinction、人格同一性)
  2. 關於心靈的主要理論(本質和性質二元論、心腦同一理論、分析的行為主義、功能主義、排除的實在論)
  3. 了解心靈所需的關鍵概念(意向性、優先通道感質、極端翻譯、隨附性
  4. 相關的思想實驗(黑白瑪莉、大腦移植、中文房間、笛卡兒惡魔、感質倒反/取消、the Luminous Room、Super Blindsight、圖靈測試)
現在英美分析哲學和歐陸哲學的差異已經不像以往般劇烈,特別是在心靈哲學和意識問題的研究領域。然而,許多台灣的學生可能會發現我選擇的文本跟其它有著類似名稱的課程比起來有比較強烈的實證和自然主義傾向。這反應了教師自己的某些立場︰簡化地說,雖然不否認哲學的先驗特徵,但依然強調它與經驗科學的接軌。
給學生一個機會「做」而非「欣賞」哲學,也是這門課的目標之一。換句話說,學生們必須學會建構自己的論證來批評理論,這個論證將會是課堂及期末報告的內容。
重視這一點︰我們通常不對心靈哲學理論報有物理學理論那樣的期許︰當一個物理理論被適當地建立起來,就算並非完美無瑕,多少還是可以被用來做一些事情。然而,少有心靈哲學理論能夠像物理理論那樣得到學界的共識。基於這些以及其它理由,心靈哲學理論應當被不斷地重新審視及修正。因此我希望學生對它們「做」一些事情,即使這些事情是大幅修改或者反駁。這樣的精神,正如尼采所敘述︰「當他說到那,他的門徒大叫︰『但是我相信你的教誨,我是如此認真地對待它,以至於我會搜竭我的內心,找出所有可能的反駁』革命家大笑︰『這種訓練方式,』他說,『是最好的』」

▌閱讀材料

背景閱讀︰對這門課有興趣,但缺乏相關背景的同學,我推薦你閱讀下面這些材料,不管是在課程之前或者與課程同時並進。
  • Carruthers, Peter 2004 The Nature of the Mind: An Introduction. Routledge. ISBN: 0-415-29994-2.
  • Churchland, Paul M. 1988 Matter and Consciousness, Revised Edition. MIT Press. (A Chinese translation is available locally—see bibliography. )
  • Cockburn, David 2001 An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind: Souls, Science and Human Beings. Macmillan. ISBN: 0-333-96122-6.
  • Graham, George 1998 Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction, 2nd Edition. Blackwell.
學期前三分之一至二分之一︰
  • Heil, John 2004 Philosophy of Mind: A Contemporary Introduction, 2nd Edition. London: Routledge. ISBN: 0-415-28355-8.
讀完Heil之後,我們會選擇反映學生背景和興趣的閱讀材料,詳見書目清單。

▌授課方向

問題導向︰在哲學裡,我和Brian Leiter一樣區分問題導向和歷史探索這兩種研究方向。前者視哲學為一連串解決問題的嘗試,例如,心靈只是腦嗎?要解釋心靈現象,一場科學革命是不可避免的嗎?有心靈的東西和沒有心靈的東西之間在什麼面相上有哪些不同?意向性(intentionality)可以被自然化地解釋(naturalized)嗎?我們的直覺在什麼時候是可靠的?歷史導向的研究著重在釐清歷史上的哲學家們對各哲學議題的看法,以及這些思想和現代爭論之間的關係。例如,笛卡兒真的是個笛卡兒主義者(Cartesian,即笛卡兒式的二元論者)嗎?換句話說,笛卡兒的想法可曾被當代批評二元論的學者所扭曲?或者,是否笛卡兒只是在政治的考量下,而非智性的考量下,做出了心和物的區分?當布倫塔諾(Brentano)提到「意向內存性」(intentional inexistence)的時候,他指的到底是什麼?他說的是意向性的對象是存在於心中,還是心靈可以意向地指向不存在東西?或者兩者皆是?我瞭解歷史探索的價值,但這門課將著重問題導向研究。
操作性︰我一直都相信好的哲學理論會是可操作的。一個好的心靈哲學理論,將能夠指導我們如何在自然研究上有效率地花費資源和金錢。這樣的理論會讓我們知道,什麼樣的研究計畫、什麼樣的心理治療、什麼樣的活動能夠有效地使我們累積知識、恢復健康以及獲得充實的生命。當然,建築一個好理論需要大量的努力加上面對雜亂未整理的資料的意志。然而,不管是自然科學還是哲學領域,只要是能夠在那些我們在乎的地方給予指導的理論,在這方面都是一樣的。
哲學的特色︰我認為哲學不只是處理那些我們目前無法回答的問題,而且還是那些
  • 我們意識到自己問的方式不正確的問題
  • 涉及不容易操作和分析的概念的問題
  • 我們不清楚該使用什麼研究方法來解決的問題
  • 涉及我們對其內容尚無共識的現象的問題
舉例來說,考慮「心靈就是大腦嗎?」這個問題。針對這個問題,我們可能有好理由擔憂︰
  • 那些等待說明的現象,或許並沒有被我們使用的名詞(「心靈」、「大腦」)很好地掌握住。
  • 我們並不清楚哪些腦活動需要預設心靈的存在。
  • 雖然神經—認知科學(neuro-cognitive sciences)以腦作為研究對象,但是關於心靈,它們能說的極為有限。
  • 關於經驗的感質面向的爭論,包括它是否是不可在人際之間比較、不可分析、無法使用言語描述或只能在第一人稱觀點之下感知。
  • 在這些相關的現象上無法取得共識,使得心腦同一理論的未來更加艱辛。
哲學與科學的接續性︰我的研究取向預設了對神經科學的進展的忽視可能導致心靈哲學研究徒勞無功。我並不認為這樣的態度是新的,甚至我覺得它算是一種復古,類似古希臘自然哲學家(natural philosopher)。就算在21世紀,我們依然授予那些研究數學、基本科學和人文學的人哲學博士(Doctorates of Philosophy)。這是在科學和哲學依然緊密連結的那個時候留下來的習慣。想想那些哲學家,例如洛克、休姆甚至柏克萊和康德的心靈理論是如何涵蓋那些現在已經屬於心理學和生理學的領域。最少,這個取向要求哲學家重視來自於經驗科學的知識進展。經驗科學提供了哲學家豐富的研究材料,例如,我相信對於人格(personhood)和人格同一性(personal identity)的研究在受到神經病理學(neuropathology)的成果供給之後進展迅速。更甚者,我相信那些經過內省而得來的結果需要受到對於主體感覺研究的糾正。在更一般的情境下,經驗科學研究能有效阻止我們進入太扯太誇張的思想世界,或者過度依賴那些惡名昭彰的思想實驗,例如「殭屍世界」、「沼澤人」、「黑白瑪莉」、「中文房間」等等。
概念分析︰當代學界對於自然哲學的再度重視並不代表概念分析作為哲學研究方法已經或者應該被放棄。這只代表概念分析不再應該是純粹先驗的︰我們應該以同時具有先驗和經驗性的方法來分析那些重要的概念,例如信念、慾望、意向性(intention)、理性以及表徵(representation)等等。Quine對於分析/綜合區分的批評、Putnam和Burge在語意外在論(semantic externalism)上的進展,以及其它相關的論證,都顯示純粹先驗的概念分析是值得懷疑的。然而,這並不代表我們應該放棄純粹先驗的概念分析,因為,不像化學及物理,哲學對於自己基礎概念的研究還不成熟,而且Quine的論證和語意外在論在目前依然是有爭議的。因此,我鼓勵這樣的心靈哲學研究取向︰在不忽視那些來自於日常心理學(folk psychology)的先於理論的蘊含(implication)的情況下,利用那些來自經驗科學的資源。
文本和我的研究取向的關係︰我強調哲學和科學的延續性,然而,我刻意選擇那些和我的取向不同的課本(除了Bermudez那本之外)。我相信拿一本教師自己不見得完全同意的書來當課本是比較健康的,因為哲學不需要教條。
告訴你阿嬤你在念什麼︰哲學有太多分支,太多子、子、子領域,在這些領域中哲學家建構特定的概念架構,去解決另一個(或者,更一般的)概念架構裡出現的問題,而後面這個概念架構之所以被建構出來,通常也是為了解決另一個概念架構裡出現的問題,而後面這個概念架構…。這有時候是一種時勢。在一個哲學家的研究生涯的前十年裡,他唸了些什麼?答案︰當時他研究所的老師最重視的那些東西。這不見得是壞事,不過這代表事實上大多數學術成果(發表在期刊的那些)都不會被人讀到,而且不被重視。在這種情況下,如果你不想浪費時間,而且希望別人看重你的研究,你該怎麼做?我沒辦法預測未來的學術趨勢,不過我推薦一個對於你的學術品味的測試︰對你阿嬤、你爸媽或者任何學術圈之外的人解釋你的研究。試著讓他們搞懂你想解決或回答的問題在哪,以及為什麼這個問題值得重視。如果你失敗了,找個對你的領域不了解,但有意願聆聽的同學,再試一次。如果他也沒辦法理解你在幹嘛,而且不覺得你做的事情很重要,你就有理由重新考慮自己要不要繼續幹下去。這個測試的標準可能有點高︰你研究的題目,的確有可能是有價值但難以理解的。不過依然值得一試,因為更可能的情況是︰你對自己超有信心,因為你的同學和老師都認同你的研究,而這只是因為他們也在研究一樣的東西,而且他們也跟你一樣需要心靈上的支持,特別是這群人研究的東西事實上根本不被外人重視的時候。所以,當你要挑選研究題目,除了向指導教授尋求諮詢,也別忘了跟你阿嬤談談。
書店裡的心靈哲學書︰書店裡常常有「心靈」或者「心靈哲學」這類的書櫃分類,然而,我從來沒有在這類書架上找到過任何一本和這個課程相關的書。所以,如果你是因為在書店的「心靈哲學」區看了某本書而想來修這門課,三思。
可理解性︰哲學家可能會犯的錯有很多種,而不具可理解性是其中最嚴重的。在這一點上,哲學和詩、神秘主義以及大師、權威著作都無關。實務上,如果你能想辦法把自己(的著作)弄得很模糊又引人注目(一個常見的方法是組合一些弔詭的句子、陳腐的句子並且不斷使用設問法),你會取得一些優勢。不過這並不會增加可理解性。
相反地,你必須試著讓自己變得清楚、精確、嚴謹、不拖泥帶水。就算我們可能因為語意的不確定性(semantic indeterminacy)而在事實上根本不可能做到真正的不模糊,但起碼我們應該避免那些基於懶惰和其它爛藉口的模糊。假學術是罪過,不過我發現在真學術中的模糊態度造成的傷害可能更大。(當然,在這裡我並不是在說模糊邏輯(fuzzy logic)註定失敗)
關於佛洛伊德︰基於這門課討論的是心靈,有一些學生可能會期望讀到佛洛伊德或拉康(Lacan)的著作。不過我們不讀那些。這些東西沒有被放進來的原因有很多,包括︰
  1. Popper提出的,關於否證(falsification)的問題。(雖然Popper的主張有一些問題,但是這些問題並沒有解消他對精神分析提出的所有質疑)
  2. 潛意識壓制力(censor,一個假設的存在,可以同時知道又不知道)的不一致(incoherence)。
  3. Crunbaum提出的tally argument,以及其它對於以臨床經驗取代經驗證據的質疑。
  4. 越來越多經驗指出佛洛伊德預設的心靈的hydraulic models是系統地誤導的︰談論過去的創傷回憶事實上通常會讓事情更糟。
  5. 佛洛伊德所主張的許多源於性心理(psychosexual)的行為基礎,事實上是導自已經被推翻的Ontogeny Recapitulates Phylogeny(個體發生重演種族發生史,一個主張胎兒在子宮裡的成型會重現人類演化過程的假說)。
  6. 夢的內容通常並非暗示被壓抑的慾望,而只是生活經驗的變形和重組。
  7. 對於佛洛伊德企圖說明的許多現象,現代神經科學已經給出了更好的解釋,例如,我們現在可以對強迫症給出神經調節層面的說明,而不是歸咎於超我(superego)的運作不良。
  8. 雖然常常有人宣稱佛洛伊德在概念演變史上扮演重要角色,但這是有爭議的。例如說,自我欺騙(self-deception)的複雜性早在古希臘時代就被斯多葛學派哲學家討論過。佛洛伊德自己也承認他並不是那些概念(例如潛意識)和比喻(例如冰山)的發明者,他只宣稱自己發現了用來觀察潛意識的科學方法,而這正是前面六點所質疑的。即使以這個角度來檢視是低估了佛洛伊德的歷史地位,然而,這門課是問題導向的,我們注重解決問題,而非爬梳歷史。
結論︰在心靈哲學討論中,我們可能會遇到一些主張,宣稱心靈是無意識(non conscious)的,然而,這裡的無意識跟潛意識壓抑、早期幼童性創傷毫無關係。我相信這樣的排除是合理的,因為這些概念背負的是一段智性上破產的研究傳統,而且它們造成的傷害(不管是智性上還是治療上)多過助益。雖然我相信(不管是邏輯上還是經驗上)我的判斷並非不可能被證明是過度誇大的,不過既然在現在的心靈哲學界,上面這些概念受到的重視遠遠不及我們將會討論到的那些,我覺得這樣的排除是可被接受的。

要求及評分

課程參與︰60%
不像那些期末論文分數佔了大部分比例的課程,在這門課裡,不積極地準備並且用心上課的人可能會被當。每位同學應該積極地參與每一堂課的討論。如果你偏好安靜地坐著聽課,或者只是對作者鸚鵡學舌,這門課不適合你。
每堂課之前你應該預先閱讀文本,並準備一些有助於課堂討論的問題或意見。
期末論文︰30%
  • 五或六頁就夠了,通常會超出這個份量都是因為不夠簡潔。如果你計畫寫一份大論文,請確定你準備了真的需要那些字數才寫得完的重要內容。也不要過度引用,如果你必須使用別人的想法或主張,用自己的話重說一遍。
  • 你的論文告訴我的不應該是Kim、Heil、Bermudez或是其他哲學家說了些什麼,那些我已經知道了,因為我讀過他們的書。你的論文應該針對至少一個當代討論的議題,清楚且公正地描述關於這個議題的各個立場,並且為你青睞的主張辯護。
  • 參考資料不用太多。只要好好理解和消化那些概念,你不會需要一堆書。
  • 原則上,我不要求你使用很多術語。然而,你可能會發現在撰寫心靈哲學論文時,「意向性」(「intentionality」)之類的術語會帶來一些便利,因為它廣泛地被哲學家們拿來指涉關於心靈的某個特定特徵,它能夠被明確地使用,而且它是許多哲學爭論的重點。如果你在論文裡使用任何術語,請確定你有對它的定義做出明確的說明,並且(依照你的定義)正確地使用它。
  • 七月一日以前要把論文交來。我鼓勵大家先交一份論文草稿。
  • 簡化之後的樣本論文應該長成這樣︰
    假設在這篇論文裡你要主張的是,信念,如同聖誕老人,不存在。
    格式化之後,你的論證可能會是這樣︰

    前提一︰在科學史上,很多理論曾經被推翻,而他們所預設的那些觀察不到的東西,也因此被相信不存在。
    前提二︰那些預設信念的存在的理論,都是可以而且應該被推翻的理論。
    前提三︰信念作為這些理論所預設的無法被觀察的東西,就像其它已經被推翻的科學理論裡預設的那些無法被觀察到,而且已經被認為不存在的東西一樣。
    結論︰所以,信念不存在。

  • 當然,在上面這個例子裡,要為你的主張辯護,你至少得論證說,你主張要捨棄的那些理論,真的和其它已經被推翻的理論一樣應該被丟掉,以及,信念作為理論預設的存在,真的是可被排除的(eliminable)。此外,你也應該面對幾個重要的反對意見,例如自我推翻的挑戰(「self-refutation」 challenge)等等。
課堂報告︰10%
每個學生必須做至少一次長約20到30分鐘的課堂報告。課堂報告的時間會是學期的後半段。報告者必須自製講義發予其它同學。講義的標題必須是這個報告要辯護的,一個明確的主張。課堂報告,不念稿。
(關於語言的說明以及書目我就不翻譯了,詳見下面原文。)
...
中正大學 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND SYLLABUS 2009

▌COURSE OBJECTIVES:

This course is intended to serve as an introduction to some of [1] the central problems of mind (e.g. mind-body, other minds, psycho-physical causation, the hard-easy distinction, and personal identity), [2] some of the main theories of mind (e.g. substance and property dualism, mind-brain identity, analytical behaviorism, functionalism, and eliminative materialism), [3] some of the key concepts relevant to understanding minds (e.g. intentionality, privileged access, qualia, radical interpretation, and supervenience), and [4] some of the common thought-experiments invoked in discussions of mind (e.g. Brain Transplants, the Chinese Room, the Evil Demon, Inverted & Absent Qualia, the Luminous Room, Super Blindsight, and the Turing Test) in the form that they are typically considered within the framework of contemporary Anglo-American philosophy. The distinction between Anglo-American and Continental is no longer as sharp as it may once have been, especially in those parts of the philosophy of mind that deal with problems of conscious experience, but perhaps many students in Taiwan will find that the materials I use have a bit more of a positivistic or naturalistic flavor than do those that sometimes appear in other, similarly named classes in Taiwan. Naturally this just reflects the instructor’s orientation, which, simplifying greatly, we can say doesn’t deny the a priori aspect of philosophy, but still strongly emphasizes its continuities with the empirical sciences.
This course is also intended to provide an opportunity to “do” rather than to “appreciate” philosophy. In other words, students are required to critique the arguments of others and develop at least one sustained argument of their own, an argument which will be presented in class and developed into a term paper.
To make this concrete: theories of mind (see above) are not well treated if treated as one might treat a theory in physics—a well-designed, albeit not flawless tool, that, if learned well, one can build a career upon. Few theories in philosophy of mind have achieved anything like the consensus that obtains in the natural sciences. For this and other reasons, theories of mind are best treated as ideas that need to be engaged and reworked. The hope is that students might do something with them, even if the doing means substantial revision or rejection. Nietzsche made the same point when he wrote: “When he had said that, his disciple shouted…: ‘But I believe in your cause and consider it so strong that I will say everything, everything that I can find in my heart to say against it.’ The innovator laughed…: ‘This kind of discipleship,’ he said then, ‘is the best…’”

▌READINGS:

1. Before the semester begins/general background reading: For anyone who has interest in this material, but who comes to it with little or no background, I recommend that one or more of the following be read, either before the semester begins, or in parallel with the readings assigned for the first one-third of the semester.:
  • Carruthers, Peter 2004 The Nature of the Mind: An Introduction. Routledge. ISBN: 0-415-29994-2.
  • Churchland, Paul M. 1988 Matter and Consciousness, Revised Edition. MIT Press. (A Chinese translation is available locally—see bibliography. )
  • Cockburn, David 2001 An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind: Souls, Science and Human Beings. Macmillan. ISBN: 0-333-96122-6.
  • Graham, George 1998 Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction, 2nd Edition. Blackwell.
2. First one-third to one-half of the semester:
All of:
  • Heil, John 2004 Philosophy of Mind: A Contemporary Introduction, 2nd Edition. London: Routledge. ISBN: 0-415-28355-8.
3. After finishing Heil, we will proceed to select readings chosen to reflect student background and interest. See bibliography below.

▌APPROACH:

1. PROBLEM-SOLVING: Within philosophy I follow Brian Leiter in distinguishing between problem-solving and philosophically-informed exploration into the history of ideas. The former sees philosophy as trying to solve certain philosophical problems, e.g. Is the mind just the brain? Will explanation of the mind require a revolution in physics? In what ways, if any, are things with minds distinct from things that don’t have minds? Can intentionality be naturalized? When, if ever, is intuition reliable? Philosophically-informed exploration into the history of ideas puts more emphasis on trying to clarify how some philosophers have thought about certain problems or perhaps on trying to locate the main themes of their thought with respect to modern debates. For example, was Descartes a Cartesian? In other words, have Descartes’ ideas been misunderstood by contemporary philosophers who criticize dualism and emphasize embodiment? Or, might Descartes merely have been finessing the mind-body distinction, motivated not so much by intellectual considerations as by political? To cite a second example: Just what did Brentano mean when he spoke of “intentional inexistence”? Did he mean that the objects toward which the mind is directed are internal to mind, or that minds can be directed toward non-existent objects, or perhaps both? Although I do see the value of philosophically-informed exploration, the emphasis here is on problem-solving.
2. PRACTICALITY: I’ve always believed that philosophical theory, good philosophical theory, is eminently practical. A good philosophical theory of mind, if we are able to develop one, will, among other things, help us to find a more effective way to use time, money and other resources. Such a theory would show us which research projects, which therapies, and which activities most effectively promote growth in knowledge, better health, and more fulfilling lives. Of course the hard work necessary to developing good theories might require extraordinary effort coupled with a willingness to confront potentially unsettling truths. But the same holds for every good theory in science and philosophy, at least all of those that teach us something about the things we care about, including ourselves.
3. THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF PHILOSOPHY: What I think links most philosophy is the willingness to grapple not only with questions for which we do not as yet have good answers, but also to grapple with (a) questions that we realize we may be asking in a misleading way, (b) concepts that are not easily operationalized or analyzed, (c) problems for which there is no ready consensus as to what methods or disciplines are best able to provide solutions, and (d) phenomena whose proper characterizations we don’t always agree upon. To try to make this a bit more concrete, consider the question, “is the mind just the brain?” We may have good reason to worry (a) that the relevant phenomena are not best captured when we refer to them with nouns (i.e. “mind” and “brain”), (b) that we still cannot assert, with a high degree of confidence, just what sorts of brain activity require the hypothesis of a mind, (c) that the neuro-cognitive sciences, despite the fact that they study brains, might have little to tell us about certain fundamental features of mind, and (d) that bitter disputes revolve about proper characterization of such fundamental mental phenomenon as “the way things seem,” whether it is incomparable, incorrigible, atomic, ineffable, and restricted to 1st person access, or perhaps just some of the above, maybe even none of the above. Inability to achieve consensus on proper characterization of the relevant phenomena makes identity claims—“the mind just is the brain”—all the more difficult to assess.
4. CONTINUITY BETWEEN SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY:
The way I approach things is based upon the presupposition that the study of mind, even within philosophy, if it proceeds in ignorance of the cognitive neurosciences, will likely be sterile. I don’t regard my approach as something new; more accurately, it might be described as 復古, a return to the days of “natural philosophy.” Even in the 21st century we award Doctorates of Philosophy to people who study mathematics, the basic sciences, and the primary humanities. This is a vestige of a time during which the sciences and philosophy were not so segregated as they are (in some places) today. Concerning matters of mind, the theories of Descartes, Locke, Hume, and even Berkeley and Kant ranged over what are now treated as the distinct fields of philosophy, psychology, and physiology. At minimum, what this approach requires is that philosophers recognize the value and relevance of empirically-constrained thinking and inventive experimentation. many empirical facts for philosophers to reflect on (e.g. the philosophical study To give just two simple examples: I believe that studies of personhood and personal identity proceed best when informed by studies of neuropathology. Moreover, I believe that claims based on introspection may need to be qualified by the results of studies on proprioception. More generally, the empirical sciences also help restrain us from indulging in too much extravagant speculation—a discipline like philosophy of mind that takes seriously such notorious thought experiments as those which involve “zombies,” “swampmen,” “evil demons,” “doppelganger’s with different chemistries,” “little girl-geniuses raised in colorless worlds,” “men who know nothing of a foreign language, but who are capable of simulating that foreign language,” and so forth, needs to be so restrained.
4. CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS: The revival of natural philosophy does not imply that conceptual analysis has been or should be abandoned. The revival merely implies that conceptual analysis should not be purely a priori; instead, concepts like belief, desire, intention, rationality, or representation should be investigated in a way that is both a priori and empirical. Quine’s criticisms of the analytic-synthetic distinction, Putnam’s and Burge’s development of semantic externalism, and other related lines of argument give us reason to be dubious of exclusively a priori conceptual analyses. Given though that the study of these concepts is far less mature than is the study of the key concepts employed in physics and chemistry, and given that Quine’s criticisms and semantic externalism remain highly contentious, it would be foolhardy to abandon a priori analysis. The approach that I recommend is one which is careful to attend to the pre-theoretical implications of our folk psychology, while also attending to what can be learned from the empirical sciences.
5. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TEXTS AND MY APPROACH: Because I tend to emphasize the continuities between philosophy and science, the textbooks I choose (except for Bermudez) tend not to, at least not to the extent that I do. I do this deliberately, because I believe it to be intellectually healthier to choose books with which the instructor does not entirely agree. There is no room for doctrine in philosophy.
6. TELL YOUR GRANDMOTHER WHAT YOU’RE DOING: Philosophy has too many cottage industries, too many sub-sub-sub-fields, in which people dedicate themselves to working out problems related to conceptual schemes that were devised to resolve problems in another, or in a more general conceptual scheme, which in turn were devised to resolve problems in yet another conceptual scheme…and so on the story goes. Much of this is a form of faddism. What does a person research during the critical first decade of their academic life? Whatever was popular with the prominent academics with whom they interacted while in graduate school. This isn’t necessarily bad, but it is a fact that most of the resulting publications are read by no one and most of the issues are later seen to have been largely insignificant distractions. Since I take it that you don’t want waste time, and you want people to care about your work, what can you do?
Because we can’t tell in advance just what fields will come to be regarded as fads, as irrelevant distractions, I recommend the following test of your academic interests: try to explain them to your grandmother, or your mother, or your father, or someone outside of the academic world. Try to explain them in such away that they can come to see just what the problem is, and why it’s worth caring about. If you fail, next try to explain to a fellow student, one who is willing to think hard and listen carefully, but one who knows little (and could care less) about your field of study. If this person too fails to catch on, and fails to see why anyone should care, then you have at least one reason to rethink what you’re doing. Of course this is a highly fallible test: some difficult, abstruse topics are really worth digging into. But I recommend this test because it is too easy just to find a small group of people who support what you say, because they are doing pretty much the same thing, and they need psychological support too, all the more so if the issues don’t really merit the attention they are given. So when you are choosing a topic for your thesis or dissertation, by all means ask your advisor—but ask 阿媽 too.
7. THE BOOKSTORE VERSION OF 心靈哲學: Many bookstores have a section which is so labeled. So far I have never seen any books in those sections which are in any way related to the content of this course. So if you are motivated to consider this course because of something you saw in a bookstore, think twice.
8. INTELLIGIBILITY: Philosophical sins are many, but one of the worst is the lack of intelligibility. On this view, philosophy is unrelated to poetry or mysticism, and it has no truck with the promotion of anyone to guru-status or the treatment of texts as scripture. It might be practically advantageous to find a niche in which you can be both obscure and a focus of attention (one very learnable formula for achieving this goal is to combine paradoxical statements, with banal statements, and with rhetorical questions). But that is not an intellectually respectable niche to inhabit.
9. TO THE GREATEST EXTENT POSSIBLE: Try to be clear, precise, focused, and rigorous in argument. Shouldn’t we take seriously such claims as that “vagueness” often derives from semantic indeterminacy, which may just be a consequence of how we form concepts? Perhaps. But at least we must try to avoid the types of “vagueness” that derive from laziness or evasion. Pedantry may well be a vice, but I’ve found its opposite to be more of a threat in the current intellectual climate. (I don’t intend to deny that fuzzy logic seems to be a promising avenue of investigation, perhaps an avenue that will help solve such problems as the sorites paradoxes.)
10. A SPECIAL NOTE ON FREUD AND LATTER DAY FREUDS: Given that this course deals with “mind,” some students might expect that his writings or Lacan’s writings, or the writings of people similarly oriented might be dealt with. But that is not the case. There are many reasons why, but the short list of reasons includes: (A) The falsification problem first raised by Popper (yes, there are serious problems with falsification, but those problems don’t negate all of Popper’s worries). (B) The incoherence of the concept of the censor (a hypothetical entity which is somehow supposed to know and not know at the same time), a problem that has been discussed by many people. (C) Problems with the tally argument (explored in the work of Grunbaum), and other matters pertaining to the substitution of clinical experience for experimental evidence. (D) Growing evidence that hydraulic models of the mind are systematically misleading, e.g. bodies of evidence which show that talking about traumatic memories tends to make things worse rather than better (as developed in the work of psychologist Jo Rick and others).(E) Many of Freud’s theories about the alleged psychosexual basis of human behavior are traceable to Ernest Haeckel’s now discredited principle that “ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny.” (F) The content of dreams—that which Freud interpreted as wish-fulfillment of suppressed desires—is typically rather mundane; commonly dream content is just the simulation of actual world events, merely played out in diffuse, episodic ways. (G) Much of what Freud tried to explain is, demonstrably, better explained by the cognitive neurosciences. To cite just one example: compulsive behaviors are far better explained by neuro-modulator levels than by superego dysfunction. (H) Though it is often claimed that Freud has played an important role in the history of ideas, even that claim is hotly disputed: some of the intricacies of self-deception, for example, were well known long before Freud, certainly at least as early as the Greek Stoics. And even Freud realized that he had not in any sense invented or discovered the concept of the unconscious—iceberg and other similar metaphors of mind predated his work. What he claimed to have done is to have discovered a scientific method for studying the unconscious, and that of course is precisely what A-F call into question. Even if this line of thinking underestimates the significance of Freud’s historical role, still, the focus of this class is problem-solving, not the arbitration of historical disputes. CONCLUSION: Talk of mind will necessarily include much talk of that which is not conscious, but non-consciousness, as construed by most of the writers we will read, has little to do with claims concerning mechanisms of repression, early childhood sexual traumas, analysis-induced recovery of memories, and so forth. I think this exclusion is appropriate, because I think these ideas represent a tradition which is intellectually bankrupt and which has done more harm (both epistemic and therapeutic) than good. Although I realize that it is possible (both logically and empirically) that my judgments may prove excessive, since the current academic environment is one in which those ideas are given far more attention than the ones to be addressed in this course, I don’t believe it improper to exclude them. (See comments in #6 on gurus.)

▌STUDENT REQUIREMENTS AND GRADING:

(1) Regular class participation: 60%.
A. Note this carefully: unlike many classes in which your final paper counts for
more, here, if you do not prepare and participate regularly, you simply cannot
pass this course. Students may be assigned special responsibilities for some
classes, but all students are expected to actively participate in all classes. If
you prefer to sit silently in class, or if you prefer to just parrot what the authors
write, then this is not the class for you.
B. Before each class you will be expected to prepare a list of questions and
observations that can be used to prompt class discussion. These should be
written out.
(2)Final Paper: 30%.
Note the following:
a. Five or six pages are enough; most papers that go beyond six pages are insufficiently concise. Should you write a longer paper, be certain you have enough substantial content to warrant the greater length.
b. Don’t overuse quotations. In most cases, when it is necessary to refer to someone's ideas, paraphrase.
c. Your paper should not tell me what Kim, Heil, Bermudez or some other philosopher says; I've read the books and essays, so I already know what they say. Your paper should identify at least one contentious issue discussed in these works, clearly and fairly represent the various positions, and defend the position that you adopt.
d. A long bibliography is unnecessary. Adequate digestion of ideas usually obviates the need for lengthy bibliographies.
e. You needn’t use a lot of technical terms. But a paper on mental content, for example, may find it useful to employ an expression like “intentionality” (“意向性”), because it is widely taken to be a distinctive characteristic of minds, it can be used with some degree of precision, and it is a flashpoint for many debates within the philosophy of mind. If you use any technical term, explain it clearly (by giving an example or a definition) and use it accurately.
f. Final papers should be turned in no later than July 1, 2009.
g. You are encouraged to submit a draft of your paper. After I correct it, you may revise it and resubmit.
h. Simplifying greatly, a sample paper might be organized thus:
You might wish to claim that “belief,” like phlogiston or Santa Claus is a name for something that does not exist.
Schematically:
Premise 1: In the history of science, many theories have been discarded and the unobservable entities that they postulate declared non-existent.
Premise 2: The theories that postulate beliefs are theories of the type that can and should be discarded.
Premise 3: Belief is an unobservable entity that plays a role in these theories, analogous to the role played by entities that have already been declared to be non-existent.
Conclusion: Therefore, beliefs don’t exist.
i. Of course, to develop an idea of this type you would, at the very least, have
to explain in what ways the theories that you wish to discard are similar to theories that have already been discarded, explain why “belief,” this particular unobservable, is eliminable, and confront several obvious challenges, like the “self-refutation” challenge, which alleges that a person who makes this argument is in effect saying “I don’t believe I have beliefs.”
j. See References for Philosophical Thought and Writing below.
(3) STUDENT PRESENTATIONS (10%):
a. Each student will give at least one, short (20 to 30 minutes) presentation.
b. These will most likely be given during the final few weeks of class.
c. An outline of the presentation should be distributed to all members of the seminar.
d. At the top of the outline will be one declarative sentence that expresses the thesis that is to be defended.
e. Students should not read their presentation; they should speak from notes.

▌LANGUAGE:

1. TEXT AND OTHER READINGS: Some related materials have been translated—e.g. P. M. Churchland’s “Matter and Consciousness” and Daniel Dennett’s “Kinds of Minds”, see bibliography—and some local scholars have done work in this field. I do encourage you to read those books and the works of local scholars, but all of the readings specifically assigned for this course will be in English.
2. CLASSROOM DISCUSSION: We will try to mix English and 國語 in the classroom. Naturally I will use more English and you will probably use more 國語 (though I don’t object if you wish to use only English), but I hope that at least in the use of some of the more common technical vocabulary, arguments, and examples you will try to use English. The intent of course is not to propagate neo-imperialistic attitudes; rather, it is just a fact that I communicate more effectively in my mother tongue and most of the relevant work has been written in English.
3. SOME PLACES WHERE LANGUAGE DIFFERENCE MAY BE RELEVANT TO OUR DISCUSSIONS: There may be some connection between the syntax of a natural language and the intuitive metaphysics espoused by native speakers. But one should be careful not to exaggerate the significance of this: for one thing, to say “some connection” is not to say much; for another, the alleged connection doesn’t imply that people who are not native speakers of a given language are prevented from grasping the intuitive metaphysics of said language.
4. YOUR PAPER: I encourage you to try to write in English, but Chinese is also acceptable. If you write in English, I strongly encourage you to submit an early draft so that you will have sufficient time to revise it if necessary. If you are apprehensive about doing this, let me just point out that clarity of prose and tight structure can help compensate for some of those unavoidable mistakes of diction and grammar.

▌Readings

Recent Introductory Level Textbooks in Philosophies of Mind, Psychology, and Cognitive-neuroscience; these range in difficulty from the highly accessible to the intellectually challenging.
  • Bechtel, William 1988 Philosophy of Mind: An Overview for Cognitive Science. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
  • Bechtel, William and Adele Arahamsen 2001 Connectionism and the Mind: parallel processing, dynamics, and evolution, 2nd Edition. Blackwell. ISBN: 0631207120.
  • Botterill, George and Peter Carruthers 1999 The Philosophy of Psychology. Cambridge University Press.
  • Braddon-Mitchell and Frank Jackson 1996Philosophy of Mind and Cognition. Oxford: Blackwell.
  • Burwood, Stephen, Paul Gilbert, and Kathleen Lennon 1998 Philosophy of Mind. London: UCL Press.
  • Churchland, Paul M. 1988 Matter and Consciousness, Revised Edition. MIT Press.(An authorized Chinese translation is also available:
  • 邱奇郎 (著) 。 汪益 (譯)1994 物質與意識-當代心靈哲學導讀。臺北市:遠流出版事業股份有限公司。)
  • Churchland, Patricia S. 2002 Brain-Wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy. Cambridge: MIT Press.
  • Clark, Andy 2001 Mindware: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Cognitive Science. New York: Oxford University Press.
  • Cockburn, David 2001 An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind: Souls, Science and Human Beings. Macmillan. ISBN: 0-333-96122-6.
  • Copeland, Jack 1993 Artificial Intelligence: A Philosophical Introduction. Blackwell.
  • Crane, Tim 1995 The Mechanical Mind: A philosophical introduction to minds,
  • Machines, and mental representations. London: Penguin Books. 2001 Elements of Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. New York: Oxford University Press.
  • Dennett, Daniel C. 1996 Kinds of Minds: Toward an Understanding of Consciousness. New York: Basic Books. ISBN: 0-465-07350-6. (An authorized Chinese translation is also available:
  • 丹尼特 (著) 。 陳瑞清 (譯) 1997 萬種心靈 (科學大師系列, 7) 臺北市:天下文化出版股份有限公司。)
  • Fetzer, James 1996 Philosophy and Cognitive Science, Revised Edition. New York: Paragon House.
  • Flanagan, Owen 1991 The Science of the Mind, Second Edition. MIT Press.
  • Guttenplan, Samuel 2000 Mind’s Landscape: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Blackwell. ISBN: 0-631-20217-X.
  • Heil, John 2004 Philosophy of Mind: A Contemporary Introduction, 2nd Edition. London: Routledge. ISBN: 0-415-28355-8.
  • 2004 Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Introduction. Oxford.
  • Jacquette, Dale 1994 Philosophy of Mind. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. ISBN: 0-13-030933-8.
  • Kim, Jaegwon 2006 Philosophy of Mind, 2nd Edition. Cambridge, MA: Westview. ISBN: 13-978-0-8133-4269-6.
  • Kokak, Daniel, Peter Mandik, Jonathan Waskan, William Hirstein 2003 Cognitive Science: An Introduction to Mind and Brain. Routledge. ISBN: 0415221005.
  • Lowe, E. J. 2000 An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press. ISBN: 0-521-65428-9.
  • Maslin, K. T. 2001 An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: Polity Press. ISBN: 0-7456-1687-9.
  • McGinn, Colin 1996Character of Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. Second Edition. New York: Oxford University Press.
  • 1999 The Mysterious Flame: Conscious Minds in a Material World. New York: Basic Books. ISBN: 0-465-01423-2.
  • Rey, Georges 1997Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Blackwell.
  • Robinson, William S. 1992 Computers, Minds, and Robots. Temple University Press.
  • Rosenthal, David 2006 Consciousness and Mind. Clarendon Press.
GENERAL REFERENCES AND ANTHOLOGIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND AND/OR COGNITIVE-NEUROSCIENCE :
  • Beakley, Brian and Peter Ludlow, Editors 1992Philosophy of Mind: Classical Problems and Contemporary Issues. MIT Press.
  • Bechtel, William and George Graham, Editors 1996 A Companion to Cognitive Science. Blackwell.
  • Bechtel, William, Pete Mandik, Jennifer Mundale, and Robert S. Stufflebeam, Eds. 2001 Philosophy and the Neurosciences. Oxford: Blackwell. ISBN: 0-631-21045-8.
  • Boden, Margaret, Ed. 1996 The Philosophy of Artificial Life. New York: Oxford University.0-19-875155-9.
  • Chalmers, David J., Ed. 2002 Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. New York: Oxford University Press.
  • Clapin, Hugh, Ed. 2002 Philosophy of Mental Representation. Oxford University Press.
  • Crumley, Jack S., Ed. 2000 Problems in Mind: Readings in Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. Mountain View, California: Mayfield Publishing Company.
  • Dunlop, Charles E. M. and James H. Fetzer 1992 Glossary of Cognitive Science. Paragon House.
  • Geirsson, Heimir and Michael Losonsky, Eds. 1996 Readings in Language and Mind. Blackwell.
  • Guttenplan, Samuel, Editor 1994 A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
  • Haugeland, John, Editor 1996Mind Design II: Philosophy, Psychology, Artificial Intelligence. Revised and Enlarged Edition. MIT Press.
  • Lycan, W. G., Editor 1995 Mind and Cognition: An Anthology, Second Edition. Blackwell.
  • O’Connor, Timothy and David Robb, Eds. 2003 Philosophy of Mind: Contemporary Readings. Routledge. ISBN: 0-415-28353-1.
  • Pinker, Steven 1997 How the Mind Works. W. W. Norton.
  • Robinson, Daniel, Editor 1998 Mind. Oxford University Press.
  • Rosenthal, David M., Editor 1991 The Nature of Mind. New York: Oxford University Press.
  • Stich, Stephen P. and Ted A. Warfield, Eds. 2003 The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. ISBN: 0-631-21775-4.
  • Underwood, Geoffrey, Ed. 2001 Oxford Guide to the Mind. Oxford University Press.
  • Warner, Richard and Tadeusz Szubka, Eds. 1994 The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Cambridge: Blackwell. ISBN: 0-631-19086-4.
  • Wilson, Robert A. and Frank C. Keil, Editors 1998 MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences. MIT Press.
REFERENCES FOR PHILOSPHICAL THOUGHT AND WRITING:
  • Aspenson, Steven Scott 1998 The Philosopher’s Tool Kit. London: M. E. Sharpe.
  • Baggini, Julian and Peter S. Fosl 2003 The Philosopher’s Toolkit: A Compendium of Philosophical Concepts and Methods. Oxford: Blackwell. ISBN0-631-22873-X.
  • Martinich, A. P. 1996 Philosophical Writing, 2nd Edition. Blackwell.
  • van Gelder, Timothy Critical Thinking on the Web: A Directory of Quality Online Resources. http://www.philosophy.unimelb.edu.au/reason/critical/
  • Watson, Richard A. 1992 Writing Philosophy. Southern Illinois University Press.
  • Woodhouse, Mark B. 2003 A Preface to Philosophy, 7th Edition. Wadsworth.

13 comments:

  1. OMG!!! 藍亭是政大英文系有名的老師耶....也有聽哲學系上的老師推薦他的心靈哲學。他要轉去中正任教了?? (這是新消息耶@@!)

    真的很謝謝你把大綱放上來!希望之後你在課堂上的收穫也能一起在這分享XD

    ReplyDelete
  2. 我也感覺這是門很有趣的課呀!
    期待您的分享。

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  3. 中文稿應該可以引用吧?(根據我沒上過幾堂期中考也還沒開始看的著作權法課不確定知識,翻譯作品如果已經被原作授權,那麼就是一個新的獨立的作品,著作權歸屬於翻譯者。)

    我覺得裡面關於學習與課堂經營的部份很有趣,有機會的話我想討論它。

    —————

    關於佛洛伊德的3跟6,關於臨床經驗取代經驗證據,是說臨床實驗是個不當的科學基礎嗎?而夢是由現實經驗的重組與變形,雖然跟我觀察得很像,不過這已經有獲得證實了?

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  4. yaya、EHX︰

    沒問題。

    灰塵︰

    附上連結出處就行。

    -----

    我查了一下資料,3應該是指,即使一個個案狀況好轉,我們也難以判斷這是因為分析治療師使用言語傳達了正確的關於個案潛意識的insight,打開了心結,還是只是一種安慰效應。我以前提過類似的論點,說有些人根本沒事,只是想找人說說話,分析治療師要如何區分這種人和真正潛意識壓抑的病患。

    一個常被討論的例子是移情作用(transference)。在這種作用之下,個案會在精神上把分析師當成師長或父母,並傾向於爭取分析師的肯定和認同。在這樣的情況下,我們很難區分眼前的治療成果是來自於真正的壓抑解消,還是個案取悅分析師的慾望。

    根據Adolf Grünbaum,佛洛伊德訴諸tally argument來回應這樣的質疑︰1.只有精神分析能夠獲得關於病患潛意識的正確insight,而2.僅當分析師經由言語治療擷取的insight符應於(tally with)病患的病徵,病患才有機會被治癒。所以,c.每當精神病患被治癒,一定是因為正確的精神分析。

    問題在於,如果移情作用是可能的,tally argument的第二個前提就不會為真。

    這些資料是我從這裡這裡整理的,不過我不太確定它們是不是正確的,因為如果是的話,佛洛伊德也未免太笨了。

    而關於6,我不確定現在學界對於夢的成因有沒有定論。不過我猜,即使學界普遍相信夢是現實經驗的變形,可能也不是因為找到了好證據,而是因為反對這個說法的精神分析學派沒辦法有效地為自己辯護,畢竟舉證責任應該在比較違反常識的那一方身上。

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  5. 聽起來是個好課. 這位蘭停教授曾經是英文系的教授? 哇. 也許英文系的水準終於在進步了.

    有關夢: 夢在認知科學上是一個困難的題目, 不過這幾年來有一些重要的突破, 也許二十年後一個科學化的理論是有可能的. 越來越多的實驗發現夢跟學習與記憶有關. 今年初我聽了一個驚人的 talk. 哈佛大學的 Matthew Wilson 因為發展了解碼海馬體 place cell 神經訊號的演算法, 可以即時的觀察實驗室白老鼠在做什麼夢. 結果發現他們不斷的重演跑迷宮的經驗, 但是這個 replay 比實際經驗要快上 10 倍, 而且是反向的 (從出口倒退到入口). Wilson 認為這跟計算理論中的 reinforcement learning 有關.

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  6. great introduction! thanks.

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  7. pyridine︰

    謝謝你帶來的資訊。

    哈哈,我也不知道為什麼藍亭會是英文系教授。不過,政大哲學系似乎偏重中國哲學和歐陸哲學。

    ReplyDelete
  8. 政大偏歐陸
    完全不偏重中國哲學呀~~
    上學年有一位中哲老師一直抱怨政大都不重視中哲...
    沒多久他就搬到輔大了

    老實說藍亭雖是英文系專任教授,但他在系上開的課根本就哲學課...
    例如Critical Thinking, Consciousness.

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  9. yaya︰

    原來如此,不過一個中國哲學家捨棄充滿歐陸哲學的環境而投向士林哲學的懷抱,也有點令人斐夷就是了。

    你們學校英文系真大方,Critical Thinking, Consciousness這些課說開就開呀...不知道pyridine對這個現象有什麼comment?

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  10. Consciousness 開在英文系的確是滿少見的. 講英文的人才有 consciousness 嗎? :)

    有關這個 syllabus, 我相信 The mind is just the brain. 原因很簡單, 只有相信 the mind is just the brain 的人有進展. Neuro-cognition 每年都有新的進步. 那些強調 the mind is more than the brain 的人永遠在爭吵, 但沒有提供任何洞見. 對我而言那就代表這個立場是走錯了, 而且有陷入神秘主義或是 metaphysics 的危險.

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  11. pyridine︰

    哈哈,讀英文的才有consciousness。

    我share你一部分的想法,在科學上我們應該擁抱以目前的技術和研究方法可望有所斬獲的假說。不過我相信依據這樣的準則做出的判斷還不至於是關於假說的真假的(除非我們擁抱某種實用主義的真理論),因為有可能的情況是,明明某件事是對的,但基於科學的一些限制(例如科學永遠是team work,一個人的成果要讓別人看懂,實驗要能重複做,data要能被客觀檢視),關於這件事的觀察資料,一旦寫出來看起來就像是nonsense,例如感質

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  12. it's Tim!!!!
    以前我唸政大英文的時候他可是系上的超人氣老師呀!
    當時他開在系上的課有英美哲學和理則學,
    沒想到他離開政大了!

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